Stray thoughts about how the speed of our decision-making can change the kinds of actions we end up taking.
Stray thoughts about how the speed of our decision-making can change the kinds of actions we end up taking.
An ongoing list of the concepts, methods, and heuristics used by the characters of Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, by Imre Lakatos. This is what I would have found useful the first time reading Proofs and Refutations, and I hope you find it useful too.
Chapter 1, §4 focuses on methods for responding to global counterexamples of a proof.
An ongoing list of the concepts, methods, and heuristics used by the characters of Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, by Imre Lakatos. This is what I would have found useful the first time reading Proofs and Refutations, and I hope you find it useful too.
Chapter 1, §§1-3 focus on a proposed proof for the Descartes-Euler conjecture (the Cauchy proof) and types of counterexamples.
Some meta-philosophy about how we might think about the potential for an infinite recursion of ‘meta’-ness in philosophy.
Statements about what is the case do not seem to imply what ought to be—but statements about what ought to be must imply certain things about what is the case. This post describes that observation, plus describes why I think the observation is helpful.
This is the joke that made me understand what Wittgenstein meant when he said “that a serious and good philosophical work could be written that would consist entirely of jokes (without being facetious).”
I think it is morally acceptable for people to care more for those closer to them, but only if we also morally require that people also extend such aid to those structurally deprived and disadvantaged.
Notes & Reflections on Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions (2nd Ed.) by Kenneth A. Shepsle, Chapters 9 and 10 on ‘Collective Action’ and ‘Public Goods’.
Why are public goods and services so tied up with private contractors and private money? Some game theory…
I find later-Wittgenstein more convincing than Carnap and the Vienna Circle where their views disagree about metaphysics and language. Yet as I am sympathetic to the idea that a thoughtful coordination of philosophy and science can be fruitful, I am glad to see some compatibility among later-Wittgenstein and Carnap’s views in “On Explication”.
I compare Russell's response to skepticism about material objects in The Problems of Philosophy (1912) and Our Knowledge of the External World (1914). Notably, his view on simplicity changes between the two books.